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Book Reviews
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Spencer L. Kimball: University of Wisconsin

Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 387. $6.00; augmented edition, $7.50.
The main fault in this excellent book is its misleading tide. First, the book
is about the growth and development of the insurance institution in Wisconsin.
A reader expecting a less localized discussion will be disappointed. This is not to
say that generalizations cannot be drawn from the Wisconsin experience (Professor
Kimball draws them adeptly), but only to say that the title implies a broader
base of data than is present.
Second, the words "public policy" need some explanation. The book professes
to adopt
a point of view which regards the law as instrumental in character.
It sees the law as a system that takes its initial premises from the life of
society outside the law and it ultimately justifies legal decision' in terms
of the social goals and moral standards....2
But sometimes the only "initial premises" discussed are those clearly enunciated
in judicial opinions. 3 Sometimes the motivation behind legislation that failed of
enactment is revealed, but not that behind the opposition.4 At other times large
globs of legislation are summarized without comment. And, occasionally, Professor
Kimball assumes that judges, legislators and administrators are all moved by
identical forces "of society outside the law," an assumption which has never been

proved, to say the least. What the words "public policy" apparently attempt to
convey is this: major legal events-e.g., court decisions, new legislation, administrative rulings and enforcement activities-are viewed against a background of the
then existing development of society in general and of the insurance institution
in particular; they are viewed, that is to say, in the context of society rather than
in an isolation booth. The book fulfils the promise of its title, so understood,
admirably.
As a work on insurance law, it has so many substantial merits that a reviewer
can scarcely do more than cite those parts that especially appealed to him. The
detailed account of the legislature's regulation of agents' commissions, and the
reasons for it, is fascinating. 5 The section entitled "The Development of Adminis1. Professor Kimball uses the word "decision" in a broader sense than is
customary among lawyers. As used in the above quotation, it means a conscious
choice by a court, a legislature, or an administrative officer. See pp. 311-14.
2. Pp. 5-6.
3. E.g., pp. 238-39.
4. E.g., p. 239 at n. 27.
5. Pp. 167-72.
(385)
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trative Control"O is an excellent history of the growth in power, influence and
effectiveness of the independent insurance commissioner. A fine case history of
legislative proposal and judicial disposal is presented in the review of Wisconsin's
"direct-action" statute.7 Of particular interest to Missouri lawyers, who also
must work under such a law,8 is the summary of the forces compelling enactment
of, and subsequent efforts to abolish, the pioneer "valued-policy" statute.
As a work on legal history, the book is valuable, and, so far as I know,
unique. Commentaries on the running feud over reserve requirements between
the State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., headed by a former Wisconsin insurance
commissioner, and the legislature,1o and on the contributions insurance litigation
made to the dogma of the federal power-states' rights controversy 1 are themselves
as palatable arguments for the study of legal history as could be imagined.
The only quibble I have is that the book is sometimes too highly organized by
topics. Item: "Financial Provision for the Insurance Department," beginning on
page 177, is really a discussion of the limitations on effective action imposed by
economy-minded legislatures during the century 1850-1950. "The Growth of
Administrative Discretion," beginning on page 187, then returns to 1850 and retraces the entire century, and once again the discussion centers on obstacles in the
commissioner's path to effective action. Item: The harshness of the "moral
hazards" clause during the 1930's is deprecated on page 232 under the heading
"The Standard Fire Policy." But then on pages 239-40, under the heading "Other
Proposed Reforms," we learn that its effects were ameliorated by a 1929 statute.
So unless a reader has either the time to digest the book at one sitting or the
power of total recall, he may find it difficult to visualize everything that was happening at any given point in time.
But this is only a quibble. Insurance lawyers will find here the raison d'etre
of many regulations under which they operate. Those who enjoy legal history will
find a systematic and coherent effort to relate "the law" to the humdrum events
of life. Laymen and lawyers alike should be pleased by the clear, direct writing.
This is, as I said at the beginning, an excellent book.
JuLEs B.

GERARD*

6. C. 4, § 4.
7. Pp. 219-22.
8. §§ 379.140-.160, RSMo 1959.
9. Pp. 240-49.
10. Pp. 151-53.
11. Especially pp. 270-80.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
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By Jerome Hall. Indianapolis: BobbsMerril Company, 1960. Pp. xii, 642. $9.50.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW.

Professor Jerome Hall, now a "distinguished service" professor of law at
Indiana University, has made important scholarly contributions in the fields of
criminal law, criminology, and jurisprudence, partly by books' and partly by law
review articles. This new edition of a book that first appeared in 1947 is not in
the nature of a mere revision and streamlining of the previous text, but a rewrite
thereof, eliminating certain parts, making substantial additions, and changing the
organization of the material included. There has not, however, been a change of
the scholarly purpose of the book and of the manner of presentation applied
therein. Practically the same analytical and critical propositions of the distinguished author are set forth in this edition as were announced in the first one.
His manner of presentation has remained a mixture of purely theoretical discussions, highly erudite but of hardly any interest for the practitioner, and of critical
and reform ideas that are not only of academic, but also of great pragmatic
importance. It is to be regretted that the English Homicide Act of 1957, which
marks a significant departure from certain traditional theories of Anglo-American
criminal law, 2 is only incidentally and superficially mentioned in this otherwise

deeply penetrating study.
Although it contains several criminological comments and various reform
proposals, the book is mainly devoted to an exploration of the general theory
of criminal law. Professor Hall, using a peculiar terminology, subdivides into
"doctrines" and "principles," the "general principles" referred to in the title. He
excludes from the scope of coverage the specific parts of the penal law, such as
definitions of the various crimes and punishments attached to them which he calls
"rules." He calls "doctrines" such propositions as those concerned with infancy,
insanity, mistake of fact, criminal attempt, and the like, and he calls "principles"
such overall propositions of the widest generality as the requirement of legality
and the conception of "mens rea." However, the latter term, forming a cardinal
point of his theory, is used by him not in a terminological, but in a substantive
sense, and thus given a different meaning from the traditional one. And related
thereto is the meaning which he gives to the term "recklessness."
It is impossible to state in few words what Professor Hall in an elaborate
scholarly discussion, running through a great portion of the book, expounds as
the allegedly correct meaning of "mens rea." With this apologetic reservation,
the gist of his theory may be described as follows. The requirement of "mens
rea" in addition to the criminal act or, technically speaking, the "corpus delicti,"
is not a matter depending on the given criminal law of a state, and can thus not

1. THEFT AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1935); GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW (1947); CASES AND READINGS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1949);
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1938); LIVING LAW OF A DEMOCRATC SOCIETY (1949);
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY (1958).

2. Koessler, Comparative Aspects of the English Homidde Act of 1957,
25 Mo. L. REV. 107-54 (1960).
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properly be dispensed with by creating criminal liability in the nature of strict
liability. Rather, the kind of natural law proposition of the learned author is that
"mens rea" is an intrinsic requirement of genuine or true criminality since it
marks that unethical character of an act, not to be confused however with lack
of morality in terms of general ethics, which intrinsically distinguishes an act
that may be considered as criminal from an improper, yet not criminally punishable
act. He moreover believes that awareness of the risk of harm involved in the
act is necessary to create that intrinsic criminality, and that therefore only intention and recklessness can satisfy the requirement of "mens rea," but not mere
negligence. In his opinion recklessness is not merely a higher degree of negligence,
but, for purposes of criminality, different in kind from negligence and closer to
intention than to negligence, though he seems to reject 3 the splitting up of recklessness into what German scholars respectively call dolus eventuais and conscious
negligence, 4 the second being the situation where the perpetrator is aware of the
risk of the harm, but assumes that it will not be caused by his act, the first
being the situation where, foreseeing the possibility of the harm, though not intending it, he does not care of whether or not it is going to be created by his
act.5 Professor Hall believes that the Anglo-American law is wrong, in expressly
recognizing strict liability in certain criminal offenses, as for instance bigamy
according to the rule in a majority of the American jurisdictions,6 in practically
recognizing strict liability by using the "reasonable man" test, as in the matter
of self defense,7 and in construing certain statutes, especially those involving
so called welfare offenses, as creating strict criminal liability. He rejects as unsound the felony-murder doctrine, abolished in England by the Homicide Act of
1957,8 and the similar misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. And he believes that strict
liability under statutes creating so called welfare offenses should be construed as
a kind of civil rather than as genuine criminal liability.9
The reviewer has some doubt concerning the correctness of the theoretical
foundation of Professor Hall's propositions concerning "mens rea," especially
since, as intimated before, they seem to amount to a theory of natural law in
the original meaning of that term and thus to a nowadays obsolete approach.
However, treating the matter not from a theoretical angle, but with a view to a
proper judicial and legislative policy regarding criminal liability, it would seem
3. Pp. 116-17; note 31.
4. MEnGZER, STRAFRECHT 341 (3d ed. 1949); WELZEL, DAs DEtrrscHE ST7A39 (1947).

FRECHT

5. For the different distinction 'between dolus eventudlis and dolus indirectits
in the theory of Austrian criminal law, see Koessler, op. cit. supra note 2, at
113-14, also notes 38-41.
6. Since 1956 not including California. See People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798,
299 P.2d 850 (1956). Generally see PERKINS, CRIMINAL 'LAw 835-40 (1957).
7. Professor Hall does not mention the "reasonable man" test in provocation
td homicide, where it is highly questionable on the same ground. See Koessler,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 135-38.
8. Koessler, op. cit. supra note 2, at 114-19.
9. In this connection see also PERKINS, op. cit. su'pra note 6, at 692-710.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss3/11
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that Professor Hall stands on solid ground in criticizing the dispensation from
the requirement of "mens rea" in certain offenses treated as criminal even where
this amounts to strict liability. It is believed, however, at variance with Professor
Hall's view, that this should not go so far as to exclude criminality for negligent
acts or omissions, where the legislature considers it as necessary in the public
interests to apply criminal law sanctions to certain merely negligent misconducts.
It is, on the other hand, believed that only recklessness of the kind characterized
by German scholars as dolus eventualis, where a party foreseeing the possibility
of harm, though not intending it, does not care if it results should, as a matter of
sound policy of criminal law, be treated as tantamount to intention. The second
kind of recklessness, where the perpetrator foresees the possibility of the harm but
acts under the assumption that it will not materialize, should be considered as
merely a higher degree of negligence.
While considerations of space prohibit further coverage of the rich contents of
this book, it should be mentioned that it is particularly valuable, and valuable
for the practitioner as well as the man of theory, where it deals with what
Professor Hall calls "doctrines," and where he, for instance, in a most interesting
way, analyzes and states his own theory regarding the conception of impossibility
in criminal attempt.
It is partly due to the subject of this study, partly to the author's erudite
style, that the book is not easy to read, and not always easy to understand.
However, the effort spent on perusing it is well compensated by the thought inspiring effect it exercises. It certainly deserves to -be included in every better
class library of criminal law or criminology.
MAXIMILIAN

KOESSLER*

LAW OF CORPORATE PRACTICE. Edited by Thomas G.
Roady, Jr. and William R. Andersen.' Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,
1960. Pp. viii, 423. $10.00.

SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE

This selection of articles and materials bearing on the law of corporate
practice is admirably suited to serve its declared purpose-to provide a collection
"for the benefit of corporate officials and corporation counsel who need a scholarly
treatment of some of the matters of primary concern to them today." However,
it will have wider appeal. Those not necessarily classified as corporate officials and
corporation counsel, such as the general practitioner and tax counsel, will find this
selection an informative and rewarding experience.
The compilers of this book admittedly have not attempted to cover the entire field of legal problems in which corporations are involved. Nevertheless, upon
the completion of this volume the reader is aware that the field is extensive. Very
*Member of the California and New York Bars.
1. The editors are members of the faculty of the Vanderbilt University School
of Law.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
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appropriately the first article, the author of which is Professor Miguel A. de
Capriles, presents a fifteen-year survey of corporate developments, from 1944 to
1959. The significant statement is made that "there is some evidence that the
number of persons who have a proprietary stake in the corporate system through
direct shareholding or indirectly through pension funds, insurance, annuities, etc.,
has been growing faster than the population as a whole." Among other subjects,
the article touches on the tremendous growth of interest in the special problems
of close corporations and points out that some legal writers have raised the plea
for wider legislative recognition of the differences between close corporations and
public-issue corporations. Professor de Capriles sees, during the survey period,
self-imposed improvement in standards of corporate management, but expresses
the opinion that it "cannot be said that substantial progress has really been made
toward a 'socially responsible' capitalism."
Brought together here are fourteen different selections or studies representing
the works of fifteen different contributors. With the exception of "State Taxation
of Income From a Multistate Business" by Professor Paul J. Hartman, which
contains 108 pages, the articles do not exceed approximately thirty pages each.
The reader is immediately conscious of the fact that Professor Hartman is not
extravagant with space when the scope and complexity of his subject is discerned.
In readable fashion he covers an analysis of the tax structure of the fifty states,
presenting a picture of the various facets of taxation of corporate net income and
gross income. There is a stimulating discussion of the problem, of effectively coordinating taxes and balancing the competing tax demands of the states and freedom of commerce and trade across state borders in a federal system of government,
with the suggested roles to be played by the Supreme Court and Congress. The
Northwestern-Stockham decision2 and the "uproar" the decision touched off resulting in action by Congress in passing Public Law 86-272, which was signed by the
President on September 14, 1959, 3 are given a detailed analysis. Professor Hartman
points out that, although Public Law 86-272 curtails, at least in a limited way, the
Nortlhwestern-Stockham decision and provides for studies by the House Judiciary
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee of state taxation of income derived
from interstate commerce for the purpose of proposing legislation providing uniform standards to be observed by the states in imposing income taxes on income
from interstate commerce, there is a need for these committees, or others, to give
attention to a "much more comprehensive examination of the tremendously important, but equally vexatious, problems of all the major facets of state taxation
of interstate commerce."'
Professor Boris I. Bittker gave the reviewer the feeling of being led by an

2. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959) (two cases).
3. 73 Stat. 555.
4. Since publication of "Selected Problems" the President has signed Public
Law 87-17 amending Public Law 86-272 to provide for studies of "all matters" pertaining to the taxation of interstate commerce by the States.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss3/11
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able hand through the "extraordinary statutory gyrations" pertaining to the tax
treatment of collapsible corporations. In two articles by Mortimer M. Caplin on
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, pertaining to tax-option corporations,
one is reading the scholarly work of an individual who, since publication, has become Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Interestingly enough, Professor Caplin
has the following to say about Subchapter S:
• . . Despite only one year's experience under these provisions, Congress
would be justified in striking it from the Code as bad law, not worthy of
retention even in modified form.
There may be a desire, however, for continued efforts to draft a
statute which would effectively permit 'small' businesses to select forms
of organization 'without the necessity of taking into account major
differences in tax consequences.' If this pressure exists, subchapter S
should be brought as close to partnership taxation as is possible....
In a workmanlike way the author then proceeds to outline possible remedial legislation.
An authority on the subject matter, Walter W. Brudno, presents 'Tax Considerations in Selecting a Form of Foreign Business Organization" in an article
which does not purport to describe or analyze the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, rulings, and cases in this field, but rather aims to lay down "the
basic criteria to guide in designing a structure for the conduct of a particular
foreign enterprise." Mr. Brudno distinguishes between the form in which a business is conducted and the method by which it is conducted and issues the warning applicable in other fields of tax considerations that, "A form of operation which
results in uneconomic distortion of normal business procedures may delight the
tax theoretician but it will hardly satisfy his client."
In "Initial Capitalization and Financing of Corporations," Chester Rohrlich
discusses the function of the capitalization of a business and covers such subjects
as methods of financing, allocation between equity capital and debt, par and nopar stock, preferred stocks, and bonds and debentures. Thorough papers by
Arthur M. Kriedmann and Professor Edward R. Hayes are respectively entitled
"The Corporate Guaranty" and "Extent of the Legislature's Reserve Power to
Change Common Law Attributes of Corporations." Mr. Kriedmann's article on
"The Corporate Guaranty," among other points, discusses the defense of ultra
vires, statutes making no specific mention of a corporation's power to guarantee,
statutes expressly empowering a corporation to act as a guarantor, and statutes
abolishing the defense of ultra vires.
A fascinating subject is dealt with by Thomas R. Hunt under the title
"Corporate Law Department Communication-Privilege and Discovery." The
author analyzes the attorney-client privilege and the newer "work-product" concept, as they apply to house counsel. He concludes that corporate law department
communications are exempt from compulsory disclosure under essentially the same
conditions currently applicable to communications generally. He points out that
it has been broadly accepted that house counsel and outside counsel are essentially

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
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alike, but that "there is a difference; where nonlegal functions are predominant,
house counsel cannot claim true professional status."
In three commendable studies, Charles W. Steadman presents major concepts
in the field of incentive compensation, Jack D. Edwards gives a searching analysis
of the taxation of stock options, and James F. Neal covers deferred compensation
plans from the standpoint of what he terms qualifying for non-qualified treatment.
The materials and studies by professors, practicing attorneys, and corporation
counsel contained in this book, in the opinion of this reviewer, are well selected.
The footnotes, citations, and references to source materials are plentiful. In the
concluding work by Professor F. Hodge O'Neal and his research associates, Jordan
Derwin and C. Edwin Chapman, Jr., there is a study of new books and materials
on corporation law and practice published in the United States since mid-1956,
which adds to the purpose and quality of the book.
WILLIAm

B.

SPRINGER*

*Member of the Missouri and Kansas Bars.
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